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The Use of Resources in Resource Acquisition 
Abstract 
We consider the processes through which a firm can acquire resources and argue that its 
current stock of resources create asymmetries in competition for new resources. Two 
simple models illustrate how this can work through linkages on the demand and/or cost 
side. The normative implication is that firms should expand their resource portfolios by 
building on their existing resources. Different firms will then acquire different new 














 I. INTRODUCTION 
The processes through which firms acquire resources have become a somewhat 
vexing aspect of the resource based view (RBV). From the very early days of the 
RBV, scholars have understood that in most reasonable models, if several identical 
firms compete for a resource, ex ante expected returns will be zero.
i
 Since the idea is 
that resources support super-normal returns, something has to give. Many scholars 
have worked on the problem and the debate is still ongoing (Ahuja and Katila, 2004). 
We here propose a very simple resolution: That a firm’s cost of acquiring a new 
resource and /or the value it can create with this resource, depends on the resources 
already possessed. This leads to an asymmetry in the “resource market” and allows 
super-normal profits to be had.
ii
 
We can illustrate both arguments in the context of a winner-take-all patent race. 
Suppose that the patent goes to the firm expending most “effective effort”, which we 
will think of as a function of a firm’s existing resources and the amount of money it 
invests. A firm which can produce more effective effort per dollar than its 
competitors should be more likely to win the patent and do so at a price below its 
value. Similarly, a firm which can extract more value from the patent will be willing 
to pay more and should be more likely to win and do so at a price below its 
reservation value.  
The formal model can be seen as a very simple an example of chaos and non-
linear dynamics; a case in which small differences in initial conditions cause 
otherwise identical systems to evolve to very different end states. The closest analog 
is Selove (2009) who looks at a model in which two firms can invest in either of two 
resources – enabling them to serve either of two market segments. Assuming that the 
value of resources exhibit increasing returns to scale, he shows that a small initial lag 
in one segment will cause a firm to focus on the other.  
The literature contains many alternative classes of explanations, including appeals 
to random shocks (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1986; Ahuja and Katila, 
2004), bounded rationality, or claims that some firms simply are better at the 
acquisition process per se (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). We do not address the 
relative importances of these factors and those introduced here. 
We look at cost linkages in Section II, starting with the formal argument and 
going on to offer several examples. We do the same for value linkages in Section III
iii
 
and conclude with a discussion in Section IV. 
 
 
II. CURRENT RESOURCES REDUCING THE COST OF NEW ONES 
 
II.1 Theory 
To isolate the forces driving our argument, we will make several simplifying 
assumptions. These should not be interpreted as boundaries of the qualitative insights, but 
as ways to focus on the forces that are first order. We will discuss each assumption in 
turn. 
1. Most pairs of resources are unrelated in the sense that having one will have no 
effect on the costs of acquiring the other. Furthermore, some resources increase the costs 
of getting specific others. For example, a firm with a large customer base will find it hard 
to cultivate an exclusive image. These cases are, however, not important. Just as the static 
version of the RBV tells us not to enter markets in which we “bring nothing to the party”, 
it is clear that the firms should not try to acquire resources for which they have no 
competitive advantage (or even a competitive disadvantage). So we will concentrate on 
ordered pairs of resources for which the first (existing) resource reduces the cost of 
getting the second (target) resource.
 
 (We can only talk about ordered pairs because the 
relation need not be a symmetric: A high end image makes it easier to acquire a large 
customer base, but not vice versa.) 
2. A few resources can reasonably be described by 0/1 variables – you are either 
endorsed by an independent third party or you are not. However, for most resources it is a 
question of degree; “how much”, “how many”, etc. Aiming to keep the argument as 
simple as possible, we will, nevertheless, look at a target resource that firms either do or 
do not have. In contrast, the existing resource is one that firms can have more or less of.  
3. You do not need a monopoly on a resource to make super-normal profits – small 
numbers oligopolies will make rents as well. Furthermore, many resources can eventually 
be imitated such that a monopolist can turn into an oligopolist. A few resources are such 
that only one firm can have them – patents being the obvious example. We will here 
focus on the cleaner case of a target resource that can be held by one firm only. In 
contrast, all firms have some of the existing resource, though generally not equal 
amounts.  
It will be clear to the reader that our qualitative conclusions do not depend on the 
simplifying assumptions 1, 2, and 3 above (See footnote 4 below).  
Since results are more sensitive to assumptions about the form of competition, we 
model the resource market in a very general reduced form. We are looking at a game in 
which two firms compete to acquire a target resource. Competition is symmetric in the 
sense that all relevant differences between the firms are summarized by their “effective” 
investments. Specifically, if the firms have r1 and r2 of the existing resource and make 
actual investments a1 and a2, then their effective investments are   
ei = airi, i = 1, 2..                                                                                                          (1) 
Given this, if effective investments are e1 and e2, firm i gets the target resource with 
probability p(ei, e-i), where p( ) is increasing and concave in ei and decreasing and convex 
in e-i.
iv
 Realizations are dependent such that at most one of the firms wins and p(e1, e2) + 
p(e2, e1) ≤ 1. To ensure uniqueness, we also make the natural assumption 
that│∂2p/∂ei
2│>│∂2p/∂ei∂ej│, which means that a firm’s effective investments have a 
larger effect on its own marginal returns than those of its opponent. The value of winning 
is denoted by v, which we here assume is the same for both firms.  
If both firms understand the situation, their actual investments will be  
ai* = Argmax vp(airi, a-i*r-i) – ai                                                                  (2) 
or 
 vri∂p(ai*ri, a-i*r-i) /∂ei = 1                                                   (3)   
Standard tools in economics (the envelope theorem and the implicit function theorem) 
allow us to conclude that firms with larger ri have larger expected profits, and make 
larger effective investments
v
, giving them better chances of winning the target resource.  
Since the above argument depends on possibly unfamiliar tools, we now take a brief 
look at the example in which p(ei, e-i) = ei/(ei,+ e-i). Assuming that r1 and r2 differ by a 
factor of less than 3,
vi
 (2) gives ei*/e-i* = ri/r -i. 
 
II.2 Examples 
 The learning-by-doing examples in Wernerfelt (1984) are of this type. Suppose 
that it takes two resources, say customer trust and low manufacturing cost, to compete in 
the market for a new product. If manufacturing cost position is the new resource, more 
trusted firms can sell more and will thus be able to develop manufacturing skills by 
moving down the learning curve. If customer trust is the new resource, the idea is that 
firms with lower cost can develop trust cheaper. In either case, firms can use an existing 
advantage to earn another. 
 A big class of examples is that in which the new resource shares some attributes 
with the existing resource. Consider a fast food chain which has a good reputation as 
place to have lunch. Such a firm may be able to accelerate the production of a dinner 
reputation by taking advantage of many of the attributes that built its lunch reputation. 
 The development of the new resource will often affect the existing resource. The 
examples described in the above paragraphs suggest that the feedback effect is positive, 
but this is not always the case. Suppose, for example, that a firm wants to develop a large 
user-base for a product. This can typically be facilitated by applying a “high end” brand 
name, although the brand might loose it cache in the process.    
    
 
III. CURRENT RESOURCES ENHANCING THE VALUE OF NEW ONES 
 
III.1 Theory 
A conceptually different, but formally similar, case is that in which the target 
resource is worth more to firms with more of the existing resource. So we will 
concentrate on ordered pairs of resources for which the first (existing) resource increases 
the value of the second (target) resource.
 
  If we describe this relationship by the 
increasing function v(ri), the analog of (2) is  
ai* = Argmax v(ri)p(ai, a-i*) – ai                                                                  (4) 
Using the same analysis as in Section II, we find that firms with larger ri have larger 
expected profits, and make larger investments, giving them better chances of winning the 
target resource. Specifically, if p(ai, a-i) = ai/(ai,+ a-i), we get ai*/a-i* = vi/v -i. 
 
III.2 Examples 
 This class consists of all cases in which the two resources are complements and 
thus includes the “manufacturing cost and consumer trust” example mentioned in Section 
II.2. The lower your cost, the more you gain from trust and vise versa. Another 
interesting case is that of two-sided networks. For example, a broker with more sellers 
will put a higher value on more buyers and will thus be willing to invest more in 
customer acquisition. 
 Since it takes several resources to make and sell many of the complex products 
offered in today’s markets, complementarity between resources is very widespread.vii 
While this tends to favor already resource rich firms, it also exposes them to more risk. 
For example, the value of all complementary resources is reduced if a brand name is 




We have identified conditions under which firms’ existing resources influence their 
investments in new resources. The analysis contributes to the RBV by proposing an 
alternative mechanism by which firms add to their stock of resources. The mechanism is 
close to the spirit of mainstream economics. It does not appeal to luck, bounded 
rationality, higher order resources, or the like, but simply thinks of the resource 
acquisition process as an asymmetric investment game. 
An important question is whether the forces identified are descriptively important. As 
a first pass one could look at case histories of individual firms and interpret the 
development of their resources in light of the argument. To perform a more systematic 
test, one would have to look at a class of relatively homogeneous situations, such as 
retailers in different towns or the like. However, given the embryonic state of empirical 
work on the RBV, this is likely to be very difficult. 
We are on firmer ground on the parallel question about normative applicability. The 
model makes clear and simple suggestions about the direction of investment whenever 
there are cost- and/or revenue linkages between resources. The advice in the resource 
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i
 Barney, 1986 
ii
 The idea that resources may create asymmetries in markets for products and resources 
is not new: Wernerfelt (1984) illustrated this by several examples, but did neither 
develop, nor stress the point. It has received virtually no attention since then. 
iii
 We consider cost- and value linkages independently for reasons of exposition only. In 
many cases both forces will be in play and it is even possible that one is negative while 
the other is positive. The reader will have no problem “netting out” the combined effect. 
iv
 We can drop Assumptions 2 and 3, and assume that several firms can have larger or 
smaller amounts of the target resource, by reinterpreting p( ) as the expected amount of 
the resource going to firm i. 
v
 Formally, d(ei – e-i)/dri > 0. 
vi
 If the r’s are very different, │∂2p/∂ei
2│<│∂2p/∂ei∂ej│. 
vii
 Substitutability is, of course, also very common. However, since firms are at a 
disadvantage when competing for such resources, they are irrelevant to the resource 
acquisition process. 
